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Swisher: Surveying Justice

SURVEYING JUSTICE
Keith Swisher*

I.

INTRODUCTION

If the state engages an attorney to do a job, in this instance, to provide
effective assistance of counsel, it is eminently reasonable to permit
measures to confirm that the job is being done.1
– Richard Klein
Lawyers are supposed to be loyal, diligent, and competent client
advocates and at the same time officers of the court, who bear a special
duty “to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative
process.”2 Courts, in turn, are supposed to license, regulate, and
* Professor of Legal Ethics and Director, Bachelor in Law and Master of Legal Studies
Programs at the University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law; LL.M., Harvard Law
School; J.D., B.S., Arizona State University. I owe thanks to Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky and to the
other organizers of the Judicial Responsibility for Justice in Criminal Courts Conference, hosted by
the Monroe Freedman Institute for the Study of Legal Ethics at Hofstra University’s Maurice A.
Deane School of Law (April 6–7, 2017). During the Conference, I had the privilege of chairing a
workshop entitled Control over Counsel, and Seema Rambaran provided first-rate research
assistance in preparation for the workshop. The participants consisted of judges, prosecutors,
defenders, and good-government advocates, who all were remarkably reflective and insightful in
discerning creative methods to improve criminal justice in lower-level courts. I owe them credit for
generating or inspiring the ideas in this Essay, but all errors, in fact or opinion, are mine alone.
1. Richard Klein, The Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on
Competent Representation and Proposals for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 582-84 (1988) (noting
that counsel “may resist being ‘checked up on,’ but if the long term result would be higher standards
of performance for lawyers in criminal cases, that price is worth paying” and proposing that counsel
complete a pretrial worksheet for the judge, explaining what has and has not been completed, before
a criminal trial may commence).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 & cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also id.
pmbl. para. 1 (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice.”); id. pmbl. para. 9 (“In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are
encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer’s
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interest in remaining an
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supervise their officers of the court.3 In criminal cases, moreover, courts
appoint a great deal of the lawyers appearing before them, pursuant to
both Gideon4 and statutory rights to counsel.5 Even though courts
ordinarily have the power to appoint and remove attorneys in cases,
especially criminal cases, they generally do not use that power wisely;
subpar attorneys often populate appointment lists and, through those lists
or other vehicles, regularly appear before the criminal courts.6 Both
prosecutorial misconduct and rampant ineffective assistance of counsel
fill the courts.7 Although no system is perfect, courts have missed a
ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.”).
3. Indeed, in many states, when legislatures (or others) attempt to regulate lawyers qua
lawyers, state supreme courts rebuke these attempts as conflicting with the courts’ inherent
authority to regulate the practice of law. To varying degrees, courts have generally asserted inherent
power over the admission and discipline of attorneys. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2000); Charles W. Wolfram, Inherent Powers in
the Crucible of Lawyer Self-Protection: Reflections on the LLP Campaign, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 359,
373-77 (1998) (discussing “affirmative” and “negative” uses of the doctrine); see also Laurel A.
Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against “Legal Bootleggers”—The Role of the Organized Bar in
the Expansion of the Courts’ Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REV.
65 (2009) (discussing the history of the inherent powers doctrine and the American Bar
Association’s efforts to influence it).
4. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963).
5. Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
461, 497-98 (2007) (“The Constitution requires appointment of counsel in non-felony cases only if
an indigent defendant is actually sentenced to imprisonment, a suspended sentence, or probation
enforceable by imprisonment. A number of states, however, currently require the appointment of
counsel even in minor cases punishable only by fines. . . . A number of other states require the
appointment of counsel in all cases in which the defendant is charged with an offense punishable by
imprisonment, even though the Court made clear in Scott that the mere potential for imprisonment
does not give rise to a right to counsel.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367
(1979))); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. This Essay does not need to dwell on this point because much has already been written
about the suboptimal initial appointment process in criminal cases. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note
5, at 464 (“Outrageously excessive caseloads have compromised the quality of indigent defense
representation.”); cf. Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of
the Sixth Amendment” If You’re Trying to Put That Lawyer’s Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
997, 1005-18 (2000) (providing a dialogue of interaction between two student assistant district
attorneys and a defense attorney to demonstrate the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel).
7. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 165-71 (2011); SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 65-67 (2012)
(noting that official misconduct, including concealment of material evidence, contributed to a
significant number of wrongful convictions); KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
CALIFORNIA 1997–2009, at 17-41 (2010); see also Meredith J. Duncan, The (So-Called) Liability of
Criminal Defense Attorneys: A System in Need of Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 1, 11-44 (noting
widespread ineffective assistance and the currently unavailing remedies to the problem); cf. Barry
Scheck, How to Fight ‘Bad Apple’ Prosecutors Who Abuse the Justice System, CNN (Dec. 5, 2013,
3:54 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/04/opinion/barry-scheck-innocence-project-prosecutor-
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critical opportunity to regulate and improve the practice of law. This
brief Essay offers an idea to boost the supervision, development, and as
appropriate, removal of counsel who appear in criminal cases.8
Most successful large businesses, among others, deploy a form of
360-degree surveys to provide feedback to their employees (including
executives and managers).9 These surveys give the employee
perspectives from a wide array of people with whom the employee
interacts at work. For example, the employee’s subordinates, peers, and
supervisors evaluate the employee’s performance and ultimately give
that employee input so that the employee may continually improve on
the job.10 Defense attorneys and prosecutors generally receive no such
input—not from clients, judges, judicial clerks, staff, witnesses, or
anyone else with whom they interact in their profession.11 And judges,
who are charged with supervising officers of the court both generally
and in the specific cases over which the judges are presiding,12 neither
require nor review such evaluations. This is true even though the judges
appoint the attorneys and even though many judges themselves

accountability (discussing the need for courts to use their contempt power to hold prosecutors
accountable for Brady violations).
8. See infra Part V.
9. David K. Kessler, The More You Know: How 360-Degree Feedback Could Help Federal
District Judges, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 687, 701-02 (2010).
10. Id. at 700-01. To be sure, the surveys can serve additional purposes, including as a factor
in determining annual compensation or discipline and helping the organization run efficiently. The
employee often does not know the name of the person evaluating them. MOHAMMAD ROUHI
EISALOU, HUMAN RESOURCE 360-DEGREE FEEDBACK PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL SYSTEM 1053
(2015) (“Typically, the employee receives anonymous feedback. The names of the individual raters
are kept confidential. The system is managed by a third-party, generally, the human resources
department.”).
11. To be sure, some informal and sporadic feedback does already occur. As noted in the
context of feedback for prosecutors:
There is already some informal feedback, through the courthouse grapevine and judges’
and defense counsel’s occasional comments to head prosecutors and post-trial
debriefings. Likewise, some local bar associations already question their members to
evaluate judicial performance. And some experiments with community prosecution ask
victims or community leaders to evaluate particular prosecutors’ performances. But
feedback is so important that it needs to be continual, systematic, and comprehensive.
Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 445 (2009)
(footnotes omitted).
12. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.5(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (“A judge shall
perform judicial and administrative duties, competently and diligently.”); id. r. 2.5 cmt. 4 (“In
disposing of matters promptly and efficiently, a judge must demonstrate due regard for the rights of
parties to be heard and to have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. A judge should
monitor and supervise cases in ways that reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable delays,
and unnecessary costs.”).
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receive a form of such evaluations for professional development or
retention purposes.13
In this Essay, I suggest a simple remedy: to provide courts with
better data for the appointment and removal of attorneys appearing
before them, and to provide attorneys with a key professional
development tool, courts should implement 360-degree surveys of
defenders and prosecutors.14 This approach will provide attorneys with
feedback on their performance from court staff, judges, clients, jurors,
victims, and potentially others, and it will provide judges with important
data bearing on whether to appoint, remove, or take other action
regarding the surveyed attorneys.15 After discussing 360-degree-based
surveys immediately below,16 I then discuss some likely objections and
replies to the central concept, concluding with several recommendations
for implementation.17
II.

MULTISOURCE EVALUATIONS IN LAW AND BEYOND

Many businesses and other organizations, and leaders within those
organizations, use a form of 360-degree surveys to assess performance
and even emotional intelligence. Multisource evaluations are valuable
because “collecting feedback from sources with different relationships to
the reviewee in an organizational hierarchy creates a complete, or 360degree, picture of the reviewee.”18 The process involves, typically,
surveying other employees who fall below (subordinates), above
(supervisors), and next to (peers) the evaluated employee in the
corporate hierarchy.19 Those outside the organization, such as clients or
13. See infra Part II (discussing judicial performance review).
14. See infra Part V.
15. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 702-03; infra Part V.
16. See infra Parts II–III.
17. See infra Parts IV–V.
18. Kessler, supra note 9, at 701 (“360-degree performance management is also referred to as
‘multisource,’ ‘multirater,’ or ‘full-circle’ feedback.” (quoting Edward Prewitt, Should You Use
360° Feedback for Performance Reviews?, HARV. MGMT. UPDATE, Feb. 1999, at 8, 8)).
19. Id. at 700-01. In arguing that 360-degree surveys should be used for federal judges, David
Kessler has explained further the nomenclature and process:
Generally, 360-degree performance review differs from traditional professional
development programs because it considers a larger number of sources for feedback. A
traditional performance review might, for example, be based only on an employee’s
sales data and the opinion of his or her supervisor. In a 360-degree analysis, feedback is
collected from at least three sources. First, as in many kinds of reviews, “downward
feedback” comes from the reviewee’s “superiors,” the people for whom he works.
Second, “upward feedback” comes from the people whom the reviewee manages or
directs as well as various customers, including either actual customers outside the
company or internal “customers.” Third, “horizontal feedback” comes from the
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consultants, might also be surveyed.20 The results are often (but not
necessarily) anonymous to the employee.21 In the end, the approach
gives the employee an insightful picture of how others, including
subordinates, view the employee’s performance and emotional
intelligence (among other aspects).22 In light of the thorough, diverse,
and otherwise unavailable feedback, it is perhaps not surprising that the
“[e]mpirical literature supports the argument that 360-degree feedback
can improve performance.”23
360-degree surveys have been proposed or actually used in
legal contexts. In analyzing ways to measure prosecutorial performance,
Professor Stephanos Bibas has noted that a prosecutor’s supervisor
is not the only actor with critical information about that
prosecutor’s performance:
Many other actors in the system also have relevant information about
prosecutors’ performance: judges, defense counsel, defendants, and
victims all see prosecutors in action. The ideal evaluation system
would aggregate information from these actors across hundreds of
cases. . . . These ratings would assess and aggregate zeal, investigation,
research, rhetorical skill, professionalism, ethics, diligence, courtesy,
respect, and satisfaction across a range of cases. Collective evaluation
would thus be more subtle, reliable, and resistant to manipulation than
a single statistic. This idea parallels the management trend toward 360degree feedback, aggregating feedback from supervisors, subordinates,
peers, customers, suppliers, and even competitors. 24
reviewee’s peers, either people with whom he has worked on a team or other peers with
whom he has interacted. . . . Some programs also include the completion of a selfevaluation by the person receiving the feedback; the recipient’s self-evaluation provides
a useful baseline against which to compare the other feedback received.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
20. Id.
21. EISALOU, supra note 10, at 1053.
22. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 702-03.
23. Id. at 703 & n.103.
24. Bibas, supra note 11, at 444-45 (first citing THE HANDBOOK OF MULTISOURCE FEEDBACK
(David W. Bracken, Carol W. Timmreck, & Allan H. Church eds., 2001); then citing MICHAEL
ARMSTRONG, A HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 521-29 (10th ed.
2006); and then citing PETER WARD, 360-DEGREE FEEDBACK (1997)). In terms of implementation,
Professor Bibas suggested:
[D]esigning the right survey tool would take work, to make it detailed enough to provide
useful information yet brief enough that those surveyed would respond.
Prosecutors’ offices would email these forms to victims and defendants right after
each case, and to judges, defense counsel, and police every few months. Evaluators
could also file follow-up reports to flag DNA or suppressed witness evidence that comes
to light years later. A web-based survey tool, such as zoomerang.com or
surveymonkey.com, could collect and tabulate responses anonymously. A computer
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The idea should also resonate with state court judges. Such judges
are the model, not the exception: many receive routine judicial
performance review, which in many states has evolved into a meaningful
process and instrument to evaluate judges and aid them in their
professional development.25 In sum:
More than twenty states and territories formally review the
performance of at least some state court judges. The reviews generally
cover a variety of topics, including the judge’s legal ability, her
integrity and fairness, and her communication and writing. In addition,
some states ask the judge to complete a self-evaluation. . . . While
some states solicit feedback only from attorneys, others seek
feedback from jurors, court personnel, and other participants in the
judicial process.26

The time has come to apply this insightful process to attorneys in
criminal courts, or so I suggest below.27
III.

THE JUDICIAL IMPERATIVE

Several ethical or structural sources suggest a need for judges to
supplement their presently deficient knowledge in making court
appointments and supervising attorneys in the courtroom.28 Because
judges must promote public confidence in the judiciary, they “should
participate in activities that promote ethical conduct among judges and
lawyers, support professionalism within the judiciary and the legal
profession, and promote access to justice for all.”29 Judges also must
ensure that the parties (here, the state and the defendant) receive “the

algorithm could weed out or discount outlier responses.
Id. at 445.
25. NATALIE KNOWLTON & MALIA REDDICK, INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION 4-6 (2012), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/ iaals_level_
the_playing_field.pdf (discussing judicial performance review).
26. Kessler, supra note 9, at 697-98 (footnotes omitted). Judicial performance evaluation
(“JPE”) programs have long “provide[ed] relevant useful information to voters in judicial
elections.” Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective Performance
Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 725, 736 (2007). Furthermore,
“[c]urrently nineteen states, plus Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, have formal JPE
programs, in which sitting judges are periodically evaluated on their performance on the bench.” Id.
(citing INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., SHARED
EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT app. A (2006)).
27. See infra Parts III–V.
28. See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
29. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 & cmt. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
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right to be heard according to law,”30 which “is an essential component
of a fair and impartial system of justice.”31 To preserve the substantive
rights of litigants, moreover, judges must observe “procedures protecting
the right to be heard.”32 For pro se defendants as well, courts have at
least a general, if not well-defined, interest in ensuring that prosecutors
treat defendants fairly in the courts.33
Furthermore, “[t]aking action to address known misconduct is a
judge’s obligation.”34 Thus, “[i]gnoring or denying known misconduct
among . . . members of the legal profession undermines a judge’s
responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public respect for the
justice system.”35 When necessary to refer lawyers for disciplinary
investigation, “[c]ooperation with investigations and proceedings of
judicial and lawyer discipline agencies . . . instills confidence in judges’
commitment to the integrity of the judicial system and the protection of
the public.”36
Finally, “[i]n making administrative appointments, a judge . . . shall
exercise the power of appointment impartially[] and on the basis of
merit; and . . . shall avoid nepotism, favoritism, and unnecessary
30. Id. r. 2.6(A).
31. Id. r. 2.6 cmt. 1; see also id. r. 2.6 (“A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal
interest in a proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law.”); id. r. 2.6 cmt. 4 (“[A] judge
must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard . . . .”).
32. Id. r. 2.6 cmt. 1.
33. See id. r. 2.2 cmt. 4 (“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”);
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(b), (c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (requiring prosecutors to
“make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel” and
“not [to] seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as
the right to a preliminary hearing”).
34. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 cmt. 1. Judges must report misconduct or
take other appropriate action, if they know about or at least reasonably suspect the misconduct:
A judge having knowledge that a lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects shall inform the appropriate
authority. . . .
A judge who receives information indicating a substantial likelihood that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall take appropriate action.
Id. r. 2.15(B), (D).
[A]ctions to be taken in response to information indicating that a lawyer has committed a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct may include but are not limited to
communicating directly with the lawyer who may have committed the violation, or
reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or body.
Id. r. 2.15 cmt. 2.
35. Id. r. 2.15 cmt. 1.
36. Id. r. 2.16 cmt. 1.
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appointments.”37 To appoint on the “basis of merit,” and not some
lesser or arbitrary standard, judges must know something about
the lawyer’s performance.38 Likewise, to “promote ethical conduct
among . . . lawyers, support professionalism within the judiciary and the
legal profession, and promote access to justice for all,”39 judges should
ensure that the attorneys they are appointing and supervising are
performing ethically and developing professionally.40
Notwithstanding these general obligations, judges often have little
information about the attorneys they appoint or permit.41 Worse, they
37. Id. r. 2.13(A); see id. 2.13 cmt. 1 (“Appointees of a judge include assigned
counsel . . . . Consent by the parties to an appointment . . . does not relieve the judge of the
obligation prescribed by paragraph (A).”).
38. See, e.g., Kelly A. Hardy, Comment, Contracting for Indigent Defense: Providing
Another Forum for Skeptics to Question Attorney’s Ethics, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1053, 1067-68 (“Both
the ABA Standards and the NLADA [(National Legal Aid & Defender Association)] Guidelines
prohibit the awarding of government contracts solely on the basis of cost. Instead, the standards
require that the contracting entity consider the following factors to ensure quality representation: the
categories of cases the attorney will handle under the contract, the term of the contract,
identification of the attorney to perform legal representation under the contract and a prohibition of
substitute counsel without prior approval, specific workload standards, minimum levels of
experience, a policy for conflict of interest cases and the provision of funds necessary to resolve
such conflicts, limitations on the private practice of law outside the contract, and reasonable
compensation levels and a designated method of payment.” (footnotes omitted) (citing STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 5-3.1, 5-3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993); and then citing GUIDELINES
FOR NEGOTIATING AND AWARDING GOVERNMENTAL CONTRACTS FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE
SERVICES pmbl., Guideline Part IV-3 (NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N 1984))).
39. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 4.
40. See Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to Counsel at
Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 49-50 (“The burden of ensuring that indigent defendants
receive counsel’s immediate assistance for bail does not fall solely upon public defenders and courtappointed lawyers. Prosecutors and judges also assume crucial roles. Each is charged with a duty of
fairness to the accused, with upholding the Constitution, and with safeguarding the integrity of the
judicial system. . . . Judicial officers have an even stronger ethical duty to protect the rights of the
unrepresented defendant. Indeed, the presiding judge is ultimately responsible to ensure that justice
is achieved in each case.” (footnotes omitted)). Furthermore,
[T]he trial judge “has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused
and the interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice. The adversary
nature of the proceedings does not relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his
or her initiative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may
significantly promote a just determination of the trial.”
Id. at 50 & n.265 (first citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-1.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2009); and then quoting id.). Appointing or
permitting subpar attorneys, who may be engaging in ineffective or unethical representation,
appears inconsistent with these obligations.
41. See Ronald F. Wright & Ralph A. Peeples, Criminal Defense Lawyer Moneyball: A
Demonstration Project, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1225 (2013) (“Judges evaluate the work of
counsel in at least two settings: when they apply constitutional minimum standards of availability
and quality, and when they appoint attorneys for indigent defendants. In both settings, judges
operate on the basis of extremely thin information.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1227-28 (“In
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occasionally make appointments because the attorneys have donated to
their judicial campaigns or simply because they feel that the attorneys
need the money.42 Equally as troubling, “[o]nce appointed to
represent an indigent defendant, the attorney seems to be subject to
little supervision.”43

short, the appointment decision rest on unquantifiable impressions of attorney quality (in ad hoc
jurisdictions) or on crude measures of past experience (rules requiring a certain number of prior
trials). . . . These judgments, unlike the assessments that judges make under Gideon and Strickland,
could improve if the judge had richer information available about the performance of individual
attorneys. The judge guesses about the proper attorney to appoint based on such thin evidence
because the evidence is expensive to develop, not because it is irrelevant.”); cf. Meredith Anne
Nelson, Comment, Quality Control for Indigent Defense Contracts, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1147, 117782 (1988) (“In order for the proposed legislation to be fully effective, attorneys awarded contracts in
compliance with the statute must also provide the level of representation indicated by their bid
prospectus. The legislation can only operate effectively if the individual contract attorneys and firms
operating under the system are accountable to the county administrators for their performance of the
contract terms. This [Comment] discusses the need for attorney time records to monitor counsel’s
performance and to promote effectiveness and efficiency within the system.”).
42. These appointments may well run afoul of the judicial ethics rules, see MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.13, but their occurrence is difficult to prove. See Catherine Greene Burnett
et al., In Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of Indigent
Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 595, 619-22 (2001) (“Not surprisingly, judges
responding to the survey indicate that factors related to the difficulty of the case, the defendant’s
need for specialized knowledge, and the attorney’s degree of experience influenced their
appointment decisions. The judicial survey, however, also revealed factors that influence judicial
appointment decisions that most would consider inappropriate in the judicial arena . . . . Nearly half
of the [Texas] judges surveyed reported that their peers sometimes appoint counsel because they
have a reputation for moving cases, regardless of the quality of the defense they provide, and a
comparable number indicated that the attorney’s need for income influences the appointment
decision.” (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 623-24 (“In the view of the
judicial participants, personal and political factors also play a role in the appointment process.
Nearly four in ten judges indicated that their peers occasionally appoint an attorney because he or
she is a friend, while roughly one-third of judges sometimes consider whether the attorney is a
political supporter or has contributed to their campaign.” (footnotes omitted)).
43. Burnett et al., supra note 42, at 624-25 (“A majority of judges indicated that there are no
formal provisions for monitoring the quality of legal representation in their courts. Even in cases
where informal standards are in place, there is reason to be concerned about the quality of legal
representation that may be provided by those attorneys who were friends, political supporters, or
appointed because of their reputation to move the docket. One prosecutor noted that when he
observed ineffective representation he would ‘mention it to the judge who usually does nothing.’
Another commented that he would ‘bring it to the attention of the coordinator who does the
appointment—always to no avail.’ Other prosecutors only call attention to the poor representation if
it will not harm their case. This sentiment was expressed by a prosecutor who observed that
‘sometimes I tell them [defense attorneys] where they have missed an important point; but only if I
know I can effectively counter it.’” (footnotes omitted)). But see AM. BAR ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES
OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf
(“The defender office (both professional and support staff), assigned counsel, or contract defenders
should be supervised and periodically evaluated for competence and efficiency.”).
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In addition to assisting judges in meeting their mandatory and
aspirational duties, periodic, 360-degree feedback (or as close to it as
possible) would finally provide judges, over time, with particularly
salient information bearing on appointments and removals. Moreover,
the feedback itself will likely improve the defense lawyers’ (and
prosecutors’) performance.44 As discussed immediately below, however,
caution is needed in implementing and reviewing the surveys.45
IV.

SOME OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES

This idea does present certain risks. A key concern is whether the
surveys might interfere with lawyers’ independence in a manner that
might harm current or future clients or impact negatively a laudable
professional value. Lawyers generally cannot “permit a person who
recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for
another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in
rendering such legal services.”46 Analogously as well, lawyers generally
cannot enter agreements that restrict their right to practice law.47
Furthermore, lawyers should not permit others to pry into confidential or
44. See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, Raising the Bar: Standards-Based Training, Supervision, and
Evaluation, 75 MO. L. REV. 831, 845-46 (2010) (“To learn and progress, lawyers need evaluation as
well as supervision. Lawyers, as a profession, tend to avoid self-evaluation. But there is simply no
excuse for this lack of reflection – especially when there are performance guidelines that provide
yardsticks to measure actual performance. Public defenders need careful assessment in order to
improve their skills and to progress as lawyers. Public defender clients deserve counsel who receive
continual assistance in becoming better lawyers. . . . For example, a defender’s client
communication skills could be evaluated by looking at notes in the file, observing how the defender
speaks to clients, or even interviewing clients to determine how much they understood.”).
45. See infra Parts IV–V.
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); cf. Bibas, supra
note 11, at 447 (“Monitoring also sends the message that performance matters and that prosecutors
must view judges, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and the public as their constituents.
Knowing that they were being evaluated, prosecutors would strive to serve their constituencies
better, much as salesmen and customer-service representatives do. Incentives, rather than rules,
would guide prosecutorial discretion.”). Thus, “[k]nowing that they were being evaluated,”
prosecutors would change their behavior in a concerning manner. Bibas, supra note 10, at 447.
47. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.6 (“A lawyer shall not participate in offering or
making: (a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement
that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or (b) an agreement in which a restriction on the
lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.”). The accompanying
official comment asserts that “[a]n agreement restricting the right of lawyers to practice after
leaving a firm not only limits their professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to
choose a lawyer.” Id. r. 5.6 cmt. 1. Here, the analogy is fairly weak, but as an example, the rule
inhibits certain interference with the lawyer’s practice and the surveys (if the results are low or
misused) might result in a court removing the attorney from the panel or rescinding or refusing to
renew an indigent-defense contract.
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privileged client information.48 Because the judiciary appoints lawyers
and pays (or authorizes payment) for many criminal defense lawyers, the
use of these surveys, including the judicial and prosecutorial responses,
could impact the lawyer’s independence and professional judgment and
(if the lawyer scores low) limit the lawyer’s ability to practice before
certain courts.
Interestingly, although the governing ethical rules effectively
require lawyers to protect their independence from various sources, a
key exception (but often an implicit one) is the courts. For example, a
lawyer’s requirement of candor is heightened to some extent for courts.49
This is not necessarily the place to discuss, but perhaps just to flag, that
the judiciary (as the most direct regulator of lawyers) has the power to,
and does, interfere with lawyers’ independence. This regulatory
interference unsurprisingly exists, but it often is implemented in
commendable or even necessary ways.50
Because the judiciary has this power, this Essay assumes that the
judiciary could in fact impose the survey suggestions. The question still
remains whether it would be wise to do so. In an adversarial system, low
ratings from judges or opposing counsel may work to rid the system of
worthy advocates; in other words, the surveys might not simply identify
advocates who are rendering suboptimal performance, but might also,
consciously or subconsciously, be gamed with low scores for those
advocates who effectively challenge the respondent judges or opposing
counsel.51 Could, in response, sufficient controls be put into place to
eliminate or significantly limit this weighty concern?

48. See id. r. 1.8(f) (“A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from
one other than the client unless: (1) the client gives informed consent; (2) there is no interference
with the lawyer’s independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.”
(emphasis added)).
49. See, e.g., id. r. 3.3. Where this rule, regulating candor toward tribunals, applies, it
overrides the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to the client. See id. r. 3.3(c).
50. For example, the courts have required that lawyers adhere to the ethical rules and pay into
a client protection fund. Ctr. for Prof’l Responsibility, Client Protection Funds, A.B.A.,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/client_protection/tplart0
2.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2017); see, e.g., Client Protection Fund, ST. B. MICH.,
https://www.michbar.org/client/protectionfund (last visited Nov. 15, 2017).
51. Cf. Burnett et al., supra note 42, at 624-25 (“This situation is complicated by the fact that
what is deemed ‘competent’ may depend on one’s vantage point in the judicial system. A defense
attorney from Galveston County noted that ‘some judges will not appoint lawyers who they don’t
think are competent. The problem is that for at least one judge, competence means pleading the case
out quickly.’” (footnote omitted)).
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One responsive measure would be to pull the teeth out of the idea
by using the surveys for only professional development,52 not
appointments, disqualifications, disciplinary referrals, or other potential
uses. The results could even be confidential such that only the surveyed
lawyer receives the results. While the resulting surveys would still be an
improvement over the status quo (nothing), these limiting measures
would also strip away some of the idea’s greatest opportunities. Another
measure, perhaps equally as drastic, would be to eliminate opposing
counsel as respondents. But this eliminates a potentially valuable piece
of feedback (including strategic insights for the surveyed lawyer for
future dealings with opposing counsel and the benefits to future clients
to the extent that the lawyer incorporates the feedback). In light of this
value, a better solution might be to recognize that the feedback of
opposing counsel might not be objective or even fully candid and to
discount it accordingly. Likewise, one judge’s negative comments
(which could, for instance, represent retaliation against an advocate who
thoroughly litigates non-frivolous issues) should not necessarily deserve
more weight than the feedback from other respondents. The beauty of
these surveys is that over time a clearer, less biased picture will shine
through as more and more respondents evaluate the lawyer. Some
objective lessons will likely surface in the aggregated data.
Risks to effective advocates are not the only risks, however; risks to
responding clients are also present. Clients might reveal, intentionally or
inadvertently, privileged information (and almost certainly otherwise
confidential information). But clients are permitted to waive privilege
and have no confidentiality obligations.53 The risk of prejudice to them
52. Kessler, supra note 9, at 687-88, 706-07 (noting in the context of judicial performance
review that feedback may be for “professional development (helping judges become more effective)
rather than performance evaluation (ranking and grading judges)”). In the peer review context, see
Alan Paterson, Peer Review and Quality Assurance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 757, 767-70, 778 (2007)
(“Finally, peer review has not only the potential to penalize, but also the potential to reward. Thus
when it comes to deciding in the future which lawyers might make the best judges, peer review
assessments may even provide objective evidence to judicial appointments commissions with which
to enhance the process of judicial selection.”). In this Essay, I am not focusing on peer review,
which can mean “the evaluation of specified aspects of service provided by a person or organization
against specified criteria and levels of performance by an independent person (or persons) with
significant current or recent practical experience in the area(s) being reviewed.” Paterson, supra, at
759 n.9 (citing RICHARD MOORHEAD ET AL., QUALITY AND COST: FINAL REPORT ON THE
CONTRACTING OF CIVIL, NON-FAMILY ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE PILOT (2001)). Peer review, at
least informally, might rely in part on the survey results, however.
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 502 (describing waiver of attorney-client privilege); MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (stating that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,” without mentioning any such
duty on the client (emphasis added)). The ethical rules do not apply to non-lawyer clients. See
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is also significantly reduced because the surveys would occur after the
case (or at least after one important stage of the case, such as the
sentencing or direct appeal) has concluded. Furthermore, the survey
results are typically anonymous. The potential for privileged revelations
could also be limited (presumably eliminated) by neither asking openended questions nor using comment boxes, although this solution would
significantly limit the amount of valuable feedback. To avoid the risk
that an adversary might try to identify and use privileged information
against the client while seeking to preserve the valuable feedback
to the surveyed lawyer, a fertile middle ground might be to share
the open-ended responses or comments only with the surveyed lawyer.54
But defendants’ feedback does not just present opportunities for
professional development; it also presents opportunities to criticize the
attorneys unfairly. The feedback on occasion might well fault the
attorneys for failing to meet unreasonable expectations. But judges and
disciplinary authorities recognize that criminal defendants often
complain about their attorneys—indeed, the system (through ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel jurisprudence) virtually necessitates such
complaints—so that the defendants may overcome procedural barriers to
their attempts to seek collateral relief. Perhaps even more for prosecutors
than defenders, defendants’ feedback presents obvious challenges, in
part because prosecutors are pitted against the defendants and often seek
to incarcerate the defendants (among other penalties and collateral
consequences). Of course, that criminal defendants do not generally hold
favorable opinions of their prosecutors will be no surprise to the
reviewing judges. Unlike defenders, prosecutors have no client who can
provide (potentially) counteracting feedback. But prosecutors typically
have supervisors (unlike small firm or solo criminal defenders), and their
supervisors not only function as analogous to a client in certain
respects,55 but they also can provide another source of feedback to
compensate, at least partially, for the loss of actual client feedback.
Supervisors, however, might be too distant to evaluate the prosecutor’s
performance adequately, or they might be too close to evaluate the
performance objectively.56 In that event, prosecutors will receive less
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a). Clients, of course, occasionally but not typically have
confidentiality obligations pursuant to an agreement or a duty to a third party.
54. This way, even though the results are anonymous in many such feedback systems, judges
or prosecutors would not receive copies of even anonymous responses containing potentially
privileged information.
55. Cf. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard
3-1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2015).
56. See H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized Scourge of the
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credible sources of feedback, but they will still benefit from a variety of
other sources—a benefit that they do not currently receive.
For all of the surveyed attorneys, the idea would benefit them, not
just clients or courts. Everyone improves from honest feedback,
especially from a variety of perspectives.57 This opportunity for
systematic and thorough feedback can even be viewed as a gift.
Although courts are not awash in money, they do have far more money
and far more institutional resources than criminal practitioners in solo
practice or small firms, which are precisely the constituencies taking the
most court appointments.58 Courts thus can implement and bear the costs
(including time expenditures) of the survey process,59 whereas many
private practitioners likely could not. Court implementation will enable
these practitioners to benefit from the valuable feedback without having
to invest the time and money to implement the survey process.

Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 88-89 (2011) (discussing Bibas’s proposals); see also id. at
89 (“When collecting this data, supervising prosecutors would survey defense lawyers and judges
who regularly interact with the junior prosecutors, as well as the victims and defendants involved in
their cases. Theoretically, the defense lawyers and judges would provide information regarding
overcharging, and prosecutors who routinely overcharge would be censured by not receiving
promotions. Bibas’s approaches suffer from the general concerns that afflict any internal-oversight
system, specifically that policing one’s peers is generally ineffective.” (footnotes omitted) (citing
Bibas, supra note 11, at 444-47)).
57. As noted above, prosecutors will naturally receive less feedback than their criminal
defense counterparts. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Whereas the latter will also
receive feedback from their clients, the former has no equivalent. Nevertheless, prosecutors will still
benefit over the status quo (i.e., no feedback or only informal, sporadic feedback) by learning the
perspectives of the judges, court staff, and opposing counsel.
58. Prosecutorial offices might more easily bear the burden, but even they should welcome
the opportunity not to bear the extra time and expense of designing and employing the surveys.
59. See, e.g., EISALOU, supra note 10, at 1053. On costs generally, see Kim TaylorThompson, Tuning Up Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1511-12 (2003) (“Defenders
often discuss client surveys as a potentially fruitful source of information about the lawyer-client
relationship. Unfortunately, defender offices rarely conduct them. A host of reasons may explain
this phenomenon. Principal among them may be that defenders may lack the technical expertise
involved in developing survey instruments or in determining how to contact clients to gather such
information. Groups that rely on survey tools note that gathering information requires considerable
follow-up. Such efforts may make comprehensive surveys virtually impossible given the demands
on defenders’ time. But defenders could consider developing partnerships with graduate schools or
law schools such that students might undertake the implementation of the study. Should a surveying
procedure prove to be unreasonable, less ambitious efforts to solicit the views of focus groups of
clients may still be possible. Ultimately, clients offer a critical perspective because they are the
recipients of the representation and their perspectives should contribute to any definition of quality.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

These surveys, effectively implemented in the analogous context of
judicial performance review, would provide courts with more salient
input than the information (if any) they currently receive about the
lawyers appearing in their courtrooms. Defenders who score
significantly and consistently low might have their panel or contract
status put on probation or rescinded. I (among others) often speak of
disqualification,60 but removal from a panel or appointment list or the
loss of an indigent-defense contract has significantly wider impact. The
former simply removes the defender from one case (or related cases),
while the latter effectively removes the defender from potentially
hundreds of representations in the applicable court or jurisdiction.
Because adversarial gaming or implicit or subconscious biases might
impact the survey results, however, an appeal process should be built
into the system. Low-scoring prosecutors could also be disqualified from
a case or even a court, but if so, they will almost surely raise separationof-powers-related arguments in response. Whether the executive or the
judiciary wins that battle,61 the applicable prosecutors (and their
supervisors) will presumably evaluate their performance, which is a
fruitful exercise in itself. When misconduct (by prosecutors or
defenders) is revealed in the survey responses, referring the lawyers for
disciplinary investigation might also be appropriate (or required).62
60. See, e.g., Keith Swisher, Disqualifying Defense Counsel: The Curse of the Sixth
Amendment, 4 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 374 (2014); Keith Swisher, The
Practice and Theory of Lawyer Disqualification, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71 (2014).
61. This hypothetical battle and the underlying legal arguments are beyond the scope of this
brief Essay. It hopefully is sufficient to note that both sides have potential arguments to lodge.
Courts are generally permitted to regulate (including to disqualify) prosecutors, but courts
themselves sometimes recognize separation-of-powers-related arguments when such issues arise.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a), (c)–(d) (requiring various disclosure obligations on the prosecution on
penalty of sanction); People v. McPartland, 243 Cal. Rptr. 752, 754 (Ct. App. 1988); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (prohibiting prosecutions without probable
cause); id. r. 3.8(d) (requiring affirmative disclosure of exculpatory information); id. r. 3.8(e)
(imposing limitations on prosecutors’ ability to subpoena lawyers); id. r. 3.8(f) (imposing
limitations on prosecutors’ pretrial public statements); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012) (“An attorney
for the Government shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing
attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and
in the same manner as other attorneys in that State.”); United States v. Supreme Court of New
Mexico, 839 F.3d 888, 921-28 (10th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the applicable rule, essentially
equivalent to Model Rule 3.8(e), is preempted with respect to federal prosecutors practicing before
grand juries but is not preempted outside of the grand-jury context).
62. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (requiring
that judges report to disciplinary authorities or take other appropriate action when they learn of a
lawyer’s ethical violation); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (requiring, with various
limitations and exceptions, attorneys to report other attorneys’ substantial ethical violations).
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The survey instruments should be tailored to the lawyer’s role. For
defense attorneys, the surveys should probe whether the attorneys met
with their clients early in the case, asking how much time elapsed before
the clients received a meeting with their attorneys.63 The surveys should
probe other forms of diligence as well: whether the attorney reviewed
the charging document, police report, and disclosure with the client
(without prying into the substance of the resulting attorney-client
communications). The survey should also inquire whether the attorney
promptly responded to the defendant’s questions; whether the attorney
discussed possible collateral consequences of a conviction; whether the
attorney treated the defendant (and court staff, for example) courteously
and with respect; and how many attorney-client meetings (whether inperson or telephonic) occurred. Of course, these are just example
inquiries; more or different inquiries might be warranted given the
court or jurisdiction, among other factors. Moreover, care should be
taken in defining terms (for example, “courteously” or “with respect”)
that might, standing alone, be too subjective or vague to produce valid
and reliable information.
For prosecutors, the surveys should inquire whether any required
disclosures (and if applicable, discovery) were provided; whether the
required disclosures were provided in a timely manner; whether the
victim was consulted and provided any required notices; and whether the
prosecutor treated court staff, witnesses, the victim, the defendant, and
defense counsel courteously and with respect. Prosecutors (and often
defense counsel) are frequently repeat-players before the particular
court,64 thereby increasing the chance that valuable data on their
performance can accumulate.
For both sides, though, certain inquiries will overlap. Indeed,
several example inquiries above overlapped (for example, treating others
with respect and diligently handling disclosures). Furthermore, in
completing the surveys, the respondents in essence should be asked:
“Would you retain this attorney if you were in the defendant’s or state’s
63. See, e.g., Burnett et al., supra note 42, at 651 (“Standard 3.4A requires appointed counsel
to contact his or her indigent defendant within twenty-four hours after notice of appointment. To
give teeth to this recommendation, the commentary suggests that repeated failures to make this
timely outreach to the indigent client ‘is the type of consideration that can be made in reviewing an
attorney’s continued participation in [the] appointment system.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
STANDARDS FOR THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR IN CRIMINAL MATTERS
Standard 3.4A cmt. (ST. BAR OF TEX. 2001), reprinted in id. app. A at 688)); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (requiring lawyers to act with diligence in representing a client);
id. r. 1.4 (requiring lawyers to communicate promptly and adequately with clients).
64. See Bibas, supra note 11, at 447.
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shoes?” The feedback (and its implications for performance
improvement) is perhaps especially critical in misdemeanor courts,
where typically no appeal ever follows;65 in other words, no subsequent
court will be reviewing, directly or indirectly, counsel’s conduct. The
surveys could also ask meta-type questions (for example, whether
counsel informed the client or the victim of the survey and encouraged,
or discouraged, its completion).
The benefits of the idea have hopefully been exposed, but careful
implementation can also minimize the costs and enhance effectiveness.
To reduce costs and increase convenience, court administrators should
email links to the 360-degree-based surveys to those who have had
contact with the attorneys, including court staff, judges, opposing
counsel, clients, jurors, victims, witnesses, and others. To increase
response rates, the survey should be brief. To increase quality and
fairness, representatives from both the defense and prospection should
have input on the questions.66 If a jurisdiction desires to use anonymous
feedback (as is often but not always the case in the private sector),67 it
may release the feedback to the surveyed attorney semi-annually or
annually (so that the attorney is less likely able to attribute the feedback
to particular respondents).
As a much less continuous and less thorough fallback to the
multisource surveys suggested above (or in addition to the surveys),
judges could meet with representatives of the prosecution and defense
together to discuss issues that the judges and their staff have been
observing (also known as “justice partner meetings”). These meetings
also facilitate feedback from the lawyers to the judges, which is
particularly important in jurisdictions that do not use judicial
performance review.68 To be sure, other communication methods
65. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 320 (2011).
66. See, e.g., Carrie Leonetti, Painting the Roses Red: Confessions of a Recovering Public
Defender, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 371, 380-81 (2015) (noting anecdotal examples of internal
performance reviews using dubious criteria or interpretations of criteria).
67. EISALOU, supra note 10, at 1053.
68. In addition to providing general feedback, judges can promote additional supervisory and
professional development methods. For example, judges should inquire whether the lawyers
(defense and prosecution) have adequate ethical supervision and training (and offer to participate in
the training as appropriate); and judges should ask whether the prosecuting or defending offices or
agencies report errant lawyers to the bar if misconduct is discovered (as the supervisors are ethically
required to report). Judges can also ask supervisors to sit in the courtroom to observe any
prosecutors who have engaged in subpar or unethical behavior. Similarly, judges could encourage
that newer attorneys (including new privately retained attorneys) have mentors. Judges could also
encourage that lawyers take continuing legal education in ethics and criminal law.
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exist; the point is that the data, once available, should be studied
and discussed.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Surveys can be costly to design validly and reliably and to
implement regularly. With the advent of efficient and inexpensive
technology to conduct and collect the surveys, the benefits seem to far
outweigh the costs (which in any event will be primarily, but not
exclusively, front-loaded).69 People are surveyed daily about the
sometimes-trivial goods and services they receive. Because no such
surveys are typically conducted in the criminal justice system, we leave
the public with the troubling impression and reality that the service in
criminal courts is not important enough to survey for quality assurance
and continuous improvement. Let us hope that the idea of surveys
spreads, as it should.

69. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 11, at 447 (“Of course, evaluation and feedback systems are
costly. Ratings take time, and surveys and algorithms cost money. Busy lawyers and judges resent
more paperwork. On the other hand, judges and defense lawyers may welcome the chance to
improve the lawyering they face and be flattered that supervisory prosecutors would listen. Victims
and defendants may want to express their thoughts and feelings, particularly when they are
dissatisfied with a prosecutor’s performance. Moreover, the costs of rating may well be worth it; at
the very least, they are worth trying out. Some of the most successful, profit-oriented companies,
such as General Electric, invest lots of time and money in feedback, and other companies imitate
their successes. Surely that success testifies to the usefulness and value of the resulting
feedback.”(footnote omitted)).
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